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MORTGAGE CHOICE*
JOHN Y. CAMPBELL AND JOA ˜O F. COCCO
This paper asks how a household should choose between a ￿xed-rate (FRM)
and an adjustable-rate (ARM) mortgage. In an environment with uncertain in￿a-
tion a nominal FRM has a risky real capital value, whereas an ARM has a stable
real capital value but short-term variabilityin required real payments. Numerical
solution of a life-cycle model with borrowing constraints and income risk shows
that an ARM is generally attractive, but less so for a risk-averse household with
a large mortgage, risky income, high default cost, or low moving probability.
An in￿ation-indexed FRM can improve substantially on standard nominal
mortgages.
I. INTRODUCTION
The portfolio of the typical American household is quite un-
like the diversi￿ed portfolio of liquid assets discussed in ￿nance
textbooks. The major asset in the portfolio is a house, a relatively
illiquid asset with an uncertain capital value. The value of the
house generally exceeds the net worth of the household, which
￿nances its homeownership through a mortgage contract to cre-
ate a leveraged position in residential real estate. Other ￿nancial
assets and liabilities are typically far less important than the
house and its associated mortgage contract.
The importance of housing in household wealth is illustrated
in Figure I. This ￿gure plots the fraction of household assets in
housing and in equities against the wealth percentile of the
household. Poor households appear at the left of the ￿gure, and
wealthy households at the right. Data come from the 1989 and
1998 Survey of Consumer Finances. The ￿gure shows that mid-
dle-class American families (from roughly the fortieth to the
eightieth percentile of the wealth distribution) have more than
half their assets in the form of housing. Even after the expansion
of equity ownership during the 1990s, equities are of negligible
importance for these households.
1
* We would like to thank Deborah Lucas, Franc ¸ois Ortalo-Magne ´, Todd Sinai,
Joseph Tracy, three anonymous referees, and the editor, Edward Glaeser, for
helpful comments.
1. We are grateful to Joe Tracy for providing us with this ￿gure. The meth-
odology used to construct it is explainedin Tracy, Schneider, and Chan [1999] and
Tracy and Schneider [2001]. Wealthis de￿ned as total assets,without subtracting
liabilities and including all assets except human capital and de￿ned-bene￿t
pension plans. Householdsin the Survey of Consumer Finances are sorted by this
© 2003 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of
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1449Academic economists have explored the effects of illiquid
risky housing on saving and portfolio choice (see, for example,
Cocco [2001], Davidoff [2002], Flavin and Yamashita [2002], Fra-
tantoni [2001], Goetzmann [1993], Hu [2001], Skinner[1994], and
Yao and Zhang [2001]). Some have proposed innovative risk-
sharing arrangements in which households share ownership of
their home with ￿nancial institutions [Caplin, Chan, Freeman,
and Tracy 1997] or buy insurance against declines in local house
price indexes [Shiller 1998; Shiller and Weiss 1999] in order to
reduce their exposure to ￿uctuations in house prices. Such ar-
rangements have not yet been implemented on any signi￿cant
scale, perhaps because the occupant of a single-family home has
inadequate incentives to maintain the home when he is not the
sole owner, or because homeownership protects households from
￿uctuations in local rents [Sinai and Souleles 2003], or because of
barriers to innovation in retail ￿nancial markets.
In this paper we consider a household that solely owns a
house with an uncertain capital value, ￿nancing it with a mort-
measure of wealth; then the median share in real estate and equity is calculated
separately for families in each percentile of the wealth distribution. The medians
are smoothedacross neighboringpercentilesin the ￿gure. Equity holdingsinclude
direct holdingsas well as mutual funds,de￿ned-contributionretirement accounts,
trusts, and managed accounts.
FIGURE I
Fraction of Household Assets in Corporate Equity and Real Estate
by Wealth Percentile, 1989 and 1998
The data are from the 1989 and 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances. We would
like to thank Joe Tracy for kindly providing us the data for this ￿gure.
1450 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSgage. We turn attention to the form of the mortgage contract,
which can also have large effects on the risks faced by the home-
owner. We view the choice of a mortgage contract as a problem
in household risk management, and we conduct a normative
analysis of this problem. Our goal is to discover the characteris-
tics of a household that should lead it to prefer one form of
mortgage over another. We abstract from all other aspects of
household portfolio choice by assuming that household savings
are invested entirely in riskless assets.
Mortgage contracts are often complex and differ along
many dimensions. But conventional mortgages can be broadly
classi￿ed into two main categories: adjustable rate (ARM) and
nominal ￿xed-rate (FRM) mortgages. In this paper we study
the choice between these two types of mortgages, characteriz-
ing the advantages and disadvantages of each type for different
households. We compare these conventional mortgages with
in￿ation-indexed ￿xed-rate mortgages of the sort proposed by
Fabozzi and Modigliani [1992], Kearl [1979], Statman [1982],
and others.
When deciding on the type of mortgage, an extremely impor-
tant consideration is labor income and the risk associated with it.
Labor income or human capital is undoubtedly a crucial asset for
the majority of households. If markets are complete such that
labor income can be capitalized and its risk insured, then labor
income characteristics play no role in the mortgage decision. In
practice, however, markets are seriously incomplete because
moral hazard issues prevent investors from borrowing against
future labor income, and insurance markets for labor income risk
are not well developed.
In this paper we solve a dynamic model of the optimal
consumption and mortgage choices of a ￿nitely lived investor
who is endowed with nontradable human capital that produces
a risky stream of labor income. The framework is the buffer-
stock savings model of Zeldes [1989], Deaton [1991], and Car-
roll [1997], calibrated to microeconomic data following Cocco,
Gomes, and Maenhout [1999] and Gourinchas and Parker
[2002]. The investor initially buys a house with a required
minimum downpayment, ￿nancing the rest of the purchase
with either an ARM or a FRM. Subsequently, the investor can
re￿nance the FRM, if the value of the house less the minimum
downpayment exceeds the principal balance of the mortgage,
1451 HOUSEHOLD RISK MANAGEMENTby paying a ￿xed cost.
2 We can also allow the investor to take
out a second loan, up to the point where total debt equals the
value of the house less the required downpayment, and we can
allow for a ￿xed probability each period that the investor will
move house. We ask how these options and other parameters of
the model affect mortgage choice.
Our results illustrate a basic trade-off between several types
of risk. A nominal FRM, without a prepayment option, is an
extremely risky contract because its real capital value is highly
sensitive to in￿ation. The presence of a prepayment option pro-
tects the homeowner against one side of this risk, because the
homeownercan call the mortgage at face value if nominal interest
rates fall, taking out a new mortgage contract with a lower
nominal rate. However, this option does not come for free; it
raises the interest rate on an FRM and leaves the homeowner
with a contract that is expensive when in￿ation is stable, but
extremely cheap when in￿ation increases as occurred during the
1960s and 1970s. This wealth risk is an important disadvantage
of a nominal FRM.
An ARM, on the other hand, is a safe contract in the sense
that its real capital value is almost unaffected by in￿ation. The
risk of an ARM is the income risk of short-term variability in the
real payments that are required each month. If expected in￿ation
and nominal interest rates increase, nominal mortgage payments
increase proportionally even though the price level has not yet
changed much; thus, real monthly payments are highly variable.
This variability would not matter if the homeowner could borrow
against future income, but it does matter if the homeowner faces
binding borrowing constraints. Constraints bind in states of the
world with low income and low house prices; in these states
buffer-stock savings are exhausted, and home equity falls below
the minimum required to take out a second loan. The danger of an
ARM is that it will require higher interest payments in this
situation, forcing a temporary but unpleasant reduction of con-
sumption. We ￿nd that households with large houses relative to
2. The ￿xed cost represents some combination of explicit “points,” often
charged at the initiation of a mortgage contract, and implicit transactions costs
[Stanton 1995]. We do not allow households to choose among mortgages offering
a trade-off of points against interest rates [Stanton and Wallace 1998]. Caplin,
Freeman, and Tracy [1997] and Chan [2001] emphasize that re￿nancing can
become impossible if house prices fall below mortgage balances so that homeown-
ers have negative home equity.
1452 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICStheir income, volatile labor income, or high risk aversion are
particularly adversely affected by the income risk of an ARM.
Our model also allows for real interest rate risk, the risk that
the cost of borrowing will increase during the life of a long-term
loan. Merton [1973] pointed out that long-term investors should
be just as concerned about shocks to interest rates as about
shocks to their wealth; as Campbell and Viceira [2001, 2002] have
emphasized, this means that short-term debt is not a safe invest-
ment for long-term investors. The same point applies to long-term
borrowers. Long-term FRMs protect homeownersagainst the risk
that real interest rates will increase, whereas ARMs do not.
The mobility of a household and its current level of savings
also affect the form of the optimal mortgage contract. If a house-
hold knows it is highly likely to move in the near future, or if it is
currently borrowing-constrained, the most appropriate mortgage
is more likely to be the one with the lowest current interest rate.
Unconditionally, this is the ARM, since the FRM rate incorpo-
rates a positive term premium and the cost of the FRM prepay-
ment option; but if the short-term interest rate is currently high
and likely to fall, the FRM might have a lower rate. Thus, our
model implies that homeowners should respond to the yield
spread between FRM and ARM mortgage rates, which is driven
by the yield spread between long-term and short-term bond
yields. When this yield spread is unusually high, more homeown-
ers should take out ARMs; when it is unusually low, more home-
owners should take out FRMs.
One solution to the risk management problems identi￿ed in
this paper is an in￿ation-indexed FRM. This contractremovesthe
wealth risk of the nominal FRM without incurring the income
and real interest rate risks of the standard ARM contract. The
in￿ation-indexed FRM should also have a lower mortgage rate
than a nominal FRM, since the real term structure is ￿atter than
the nominal term structure and the option to prepay an in￿ation-
indexed mortgage is less valuable. We calibrate our modelto U. S.
interest data over the period 1962–1999 and ￿nd large welfare
gains from indexation of FRMs. These results parallel the ￿nd-
ings of Campbell and Shiller [1996] and Campbell and Viceira
[2001] that in￿ation-indexed bonds should be attractive to con-
servative long-term investors.
It is interesting to compare our normative results with his-
torical patterns in mortgage ￿nancing, and with the advice that
homeowners receive from books on personal ￿nance. The United
1453 HOUSEHOLD RISK MANAGEMENTStates is unusual among industrialized countries in that the
predominant mortgage contract is a long-term nominal FRM,
usually with a 30-year maturity. The monthly interest rate sur-
vey of the Federal Housing Finance Board shows that long-term
nominal FRMs accounted for 70 percent of newly issued mort-
gages on average during the period 1985–2001, while ARMs
accounted for 30 percent. Nominal FRMs have a very large sec-
ondary market, whose liquidity has been supported by U. S.
government policy over many decades, particularly through the
government agency GNMA (Government National Mortgage As-
sociation or “Ginnie Mae”), and the private but government-
sponsored entities FNMA (Federal National Mortgage Associa-
tion or “Fannie Mae”) and FHLMC (Federal Home Loan Mort-
gage Corporation or “Freddie Mac”). The liquidity of this market
likely reduces the rates on nominal FRMs and helps to account
for their popularity in the United States.
3
Figure II plots the evolution of the FRM share over time. The
FRM share is strongly negatively correlated with the level of
long-term interest rates (the correlation with the ten-year Trea-
sury yield is 20.77 in levels and 20.57 in quarterly changes).
Accordingly, the FRM share trended upward during the period
1985–2001 as interest rates trended downward; it averaged
around 60 percent in the late 1980s and around 80 percent in the
late 1990s. Surprisingly, the FRM share is almost uncorrelated
with the yield spread between ten-year and one-year interest
rates (the correlation is 0.10 in levels and 0.02 in quarterly
changes).
4
One explanation for the tendency of households to use FRMs
when long-term interest rates have recently fallen is that house-
holds believe long-term interest rates to be mean-reverting. If
declines in long-term interest rates tend to be followed by in-
creases, then it is rational to “lock in” a long-term interest rate
3. Woodward [2001] describes in detail how federal policy has supported the
FRM market. Several studies have found important liquidity effects in mortgage
markets. Cotterman and Pearce [1996] ￿nd a 25–40 basis point spread between
private label mortgages and the conforming mortgages that are securitized by
FNMA and FHLMC, while Black, Garbade, and Silber [1981] and Rothberg,
Nothaft, and Gabriel [1989] ￿nd that the initial securitization of mortgages by
GNMA lowered mortgage interest rates by 60–80 basis points.
4. During 2002 the FRM share fell even while interest rates declined. This
attracted the attention of the business press as a departure from the historical
pattern. See, for example, Ruth Simon, “Do You Have the Wrong Mortgage? In
Puzzling Move, Homeowners Flock to Riskier Variable Loans Instead of Locking
In Low Rates,” Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2002.
1454 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSthat is low relative to past history by taking out a FRM. Some
personal ￿nance books offer advice of this sort. Irwin [1996], for
example, offers the following tip: “When interest rates are low,
get a ￿xed-rate mortgage and lock in the low rate” [p. 143], while
Steinmetz [2002] advises “If you think rates are going up, get a
￿xed-rate mortgage” [p. 84]. The dif￿culty with this advice, of
course, is that movements in long rates are extremely dif￿cult to
forecast. The expectations theory of the term structure implies
that changes in long-term bond yields should be almost unfore-
castable; while there is some empirical evidence against this
theory (see, for example, Campbell and Shiller [1991] or Camp-
bell, Lo, and MacKinlay [1997, Chapter 10]), it seems overambi-
tious for the average homeowner to try to predict movements in
long-term interest rates.
Other recommendations of personal ￿nance books are more
consistent with the normative results presented in this paper.
Homeowners who expect to move within a few years are often
advised to take out ARMs to exploit the low initial interest rate.
Tyson and Brown [2000, p. 64], for example, write: “Many home-
buyers don’t expect to stay in their current homes for a long time.
If that’s your expectation, consider an ARM. Why? Because an
ARM starts at a lower interest rate than does a ￿xed-rate loan,
FIGURE II
FRM Share and Treasury Interest Rates
This ￿gure plots the percentage of conventional single-family mortgages origi-
nated by major lenders with ￿xed rates. The data are from the monthly interest
rate survey of the Federal Housing Finance Board from January 1985 to Decem-
ber 2001. The ￿gure also plots the one-year Treasury rate, the ten-year Treasury
rate, and the yield spread between ten-year and one-year rates.
1455 HOUSEHOLD RISK MANAGEMENTyou should save interest dollars in the ￿rst two years of holding
your ARM.” ARMs are also recommended for homeowners who
are currently borrowing constrained but expect their incomes to
grow rapidly: “ARMs are best utilized . . . when your cash ￿ow is
currently tight but you expect it to increase as time goes on”
[Orman 1999, p. 254]; “Sometimes ARMs have lower initial loan
costs. If cash is a big consideration for you, look into them” [Irwin
1996, p. 144].
Personal ￿nance books do not explicitly distinguish different
types of risk as we do in this paper. However, some personal
￿nance authors clearly think that income risk and real interest
rate risk are important for homeowners, because they describe
ARMs as risky assets and FRMs as safe: “An ARM can pay off, but
it’s a gamble. Sometimes there’s a lot to be said for something
that’s safe and dependable, like a ￿xed-rate mortgage” [Fisher
and Shelly 2002, p. 319].
There is a large academic literature on mortgage choice.
Follain [1990] surveys the literature from the 1980s and earlier.
Much recent work focuses on FRM prepayment behavior, and its
implications for the pricing of mortgage-backed securities (for
example, Schwartz and Torous [1989] and Stanton [1995]). One
strand of the literature emphasizes that households know more
about their moving probabilities than lenders do; this creates an
adverse selection problem in prepayment that can be mitigated
through the use of ￿xed charges or “points” at mortgage initiation
[Dunn and Spatt 1985; Chari and Jagannathan 1989; Brueckner
1994; LeRoy 1996; Stanton and Wallace 1998].
A few papers discuss the choice between adjustable-rate and
￿xed-rate mortgages. On the theoretical side, Alm and Follain
[1984] emphasize the importance of labor income and borrowing
constraints for mortgage choice, but their model is deterministic
and thus they cannot address the risk management issues that
are the subject of this paper. Stanton and Wallace [1999] discuss
the interest-rate risk of ARMs, but without considering the role of
risky labor income and borrowing constraints. We are not aware
of any previous theoretical work that treats income risk and
interest-rate risk within an integrated framework as we do here.
On the empirical side, Shilling, Dhillon, and Sirmans [1987] look
at micro data on mortgage borrowing and estimate a reduced-
form econometricmodel of mortgage choice. They ￿nd that house-
holds with a more stable income and households with a higher
moving probability are more likely to use ARMs. These ￿ndings
1456 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSare consistent both with our theoretical model and with the
typical advice given by books on personal ￿nance.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Subsection II.A
lays out the model of household choice, and subsection II.B cali-
brates its parameters. Section III compares alternative nominal
mortgage contracts, while Section IV studies in￿ation-indexed
FRMs. Section V asks whether our results are robust to alterna-
tive parameterizations. Section VI concludes.
II. A LIFE-CYCLE MODEL OF MORTGAGE CHOICE
II.A. Model Speci￿cation
We model the consumption and asset choices of a household,
indexed by j, with a time horizon of T periods. We study the
decision of how to ￿nance the purchase of a house of a given size
H #
j. That is, we assume that buying a house is strictly preferred to
renting—perhaps because of tax considerations—so that we do
not model the decision to buy versus rent. In addition, we do not
study what determines the initial choice of house size, and we
assume that the household remains in a house of this size, re-
gardless of the path of household income. Thus, we ignore the
possibility that the household can adjust to an income shock by
moving to a larger or smaller house.
5
In each period t, t 5 1, . . . , T, the household chooses real
consumption of all goods other than housing, Cjt. We assume
preference separability between housing and consumption. Since
the size of the house and the utility derived from it are ￿xed, we
can omit housing from the objective function of the household and
write
(1) max E0 O
t50
T
b
t Cjt
12g
1 2 g
1 b
T11 Wj,T11
12g
1 2 g ,
where b is the time discount factor and g is the coef￿cient of
relative risk aversion. The household derives utility from termi-
nal real wealth Wj,T11, which can be interpreted as the remain-
ing lifetime utility from reaching age T 1 1 with wealth Wj,T11.
FRM and ARM mortgages differ because nominal interest
5. Cocco [2001] studies the choice of house size using a life-cycle model
similar to the one in this paper. Sinai and Souleles [2003] study the choice
between renting and buying housing.
1457 HOUSEHOLD RISK MANAGEMENTrates are variable over time. This variability comes from move-
ments in both the expected in￿ation rate and the ex ante real
interest rate. We use the simplest model that captures variability
in both these components of the short-term nominal interest rate,
and allows for some predictability of interest rate movements.
Thus, in our model there will be periods when homeowners can
rationally anticipate declining or increasing short-term nominal
interest rates, and thus declining or increasing ARM payments.
We write the nominal price level at time t as Pt. We adopt the
convention that lowercase letters denote log variables. Thus, pt 5
log (Pt), and the log in￿ation rate pt 5 pt11 2 pt. To simplify the
model, we abstract from one-period uncertainty in realized in￿a-
tion; thus, expected in￿ation at time t is the same as in￿ation
realized from t to t 1 1. While clearly counterfactual, this as-
sumption should have little effect on our comparison of nominal
mortgage contracts, since short-term in￿ation uncertainty is
quite modest and affects nominal ARMs and FRMs symmetri-
cally. Later in the paper we consider in￿ation-indexed mortgages;
the absence of one-period in￿ation uncertainty in our model will
lead us to understate the advantages of these mortgages.
We assume that expected in￿ation follows an AR(1) process.
That is,
(2) pt 5 m~1 2 f! 1 fpt21 1 et,
where et is a normally distributed white noise shock with mean
zero and variance se
2. By contrast, we assume that the ex ante
real interest rate is variable but serially uncorrelated. The ex-
pected log real return on a one-period bond, r1t 5 log (1 1 R1t),
is given by
(3) r1t 5 r # 1 ct,
where r # is the mean log real interest rate and ct is a normally
distributed white noise shock with mean zero and variance sc
2.
We make the assumption that real interest rate risk is tran-
sitory for tractability. Fama [1975] showed that the assumption
of a constant real interest rate was a good approximation for U. S.
data in the 1950s and 1960s, but it is well-known that more
recent U. S. data display serially correlated movements in real
interest rates (see, for example, Garcia and Perron [1996], Gray
[1996], or Campbell and Viceira [2001]). However, movements in
expected in￿ation are the most important in￿uence on long-term
nominal interest rates [Fama 1990; Mishkin 1990; Campbell and
1458 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSAmmer 1993], and our AR(1) assumption for expected in￿ation
allows persistent variation in nominal interest rates.
The log nominal yield on a one-period nominal bond, y1t 5
log (1 1 Y1t), is equal to the log real return on a one-period bond
plus expected in￿ation:
(4) y1t 5 r1t 1 pt.
To model long-term nominal interest rates, we assume that the
log expectations hypothesis holds. That is, we assume that the log
yield on a long-term n-period nominal bond, ynt 5 log (1 1 Ynt),
is equal to the expected sum of successive log yields on one-period
nominal bonds which are rolled over for n periods plus a constant
term premium, j:
(5) ynt 5S
1
nD O
i50
n21
Et@y1,t1i# 1 j.
This model implies that excess returns on long-term bonds over
short-term bonds are unpredictable, even though changes in
nominal short rates are partially predictable. Thus, there are no
predictably good or bad times to alter the maturity of a bond
portfolio, and homeownerscannot reduce their average borrowing
costs by trying to time the bond market.
At date 1, householdj ￿nances the purchase of a house of size
H #
j with a nominal loan of (1 2 l)Pj1
HH #
j, where l is the required
downpayment and Pj1
H is the date 1 nominal price of the house.
The mortgage loan is assumed to have maturity T, so that it is
paid off by period T 1 1.
If the household chooses a nominal FRM, and the date 1
interest rate on a FRM with maturity T is YT1
F , then in each
subsequent period the household must make a real mortgage
payment Mjt
F of
(6) Mjt
F 5
~1 2 l!Pj1
HH #
j
Pt ¥j51
T ~1 1 YT1
F !
2j.
Since nominal mortgage payments are ￿xed at mortgage initia-
tion, real payments are inversely proportional to the price level
Pt. This implies that a nominal FRM, without a prepayment
option, is a risky contract because its real capital value is highly
sensitive to in￿ation.
We allow for a prepayment option. A household that chooses
1459 HOUSEHOLD RISK MANAGEMENTan FRM may in later periods re￿nance at a monetarycost of r. Let
Ijt
r be an indicator variable which takes the value of one if the
household re￿nances in period t, and zero otherwise. We assume
that a re￿nancing household at date t obtains a new FRM mort-
gage with the same principal as the remaining principal of the old
mortgage, and with maturity T 2 t 1 1 such that by the terminal
date T 1 1 the mortgage will have been paid down. We allow
re￿nancing to occur only if the household has positive home
equity at time t; that is, if the house price less the minimum
downpayment exceeds the principal balance of the mortgage.
We assume that the date t nominal interest rate on a FRM is
given by
(7) YT2t11,t
F 5 YT2t11,t 1 u
F,
where u
F is a constant mortgage premium over the yield on a
(T 2 t 1 1]-period bond. This premium compensates the mort-
gage lender for default risk and for the value of the re￿nancing
option.
If the household chooses an ARM, the annual real mortgage
payment, Mjt
A, is given by the following. We write Djt for the
nominal principal amount of the original loan outstanding at date
t. Then the date t real mortgage payment is given by
(8) Mjt
A 5
Y1t
ADjt 1 DDj,t11
Pt
,
where DDj,t11 is the component of the mortgage payment at date
t that goes to pay down principal rather than pay interest. We
assume that DDj,t11 is equal to the average nominal loan reduc-
tion that occurs at date t in a FRM for the same initial loan. While
this does not correspond exactly to a conventional ARM, it greatly
simpli￿es the problem since by having loan reductions that de-
pend only on time and the amount borrowed, the proportion of the
original loan that has been repaid is not a state variable.
The date t nominal interest rate on an ARM is assumed to be
equal to the short rate plus a constant premium:
(9) Y1t
A 5 Y1t 1 u
A.
The ARM mortgage premium u
A compensates the mortgage
lender for default risk.
The household is endowed with stochastic gross real labor
income in each period, Ljt, which cannot be traded or used as
1460 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICScollateral for a loan. As usual, we use a lowercase letter to denote
the natural log of the variable, so ljt [ log (Ljt). Household j’s log
real labor income is exogenous and is given by
(10) ljt 5 f~t,Zjt! 1 vjt 1 vjt,
where f(t,Zjt) is a deterministic function of age t and other indi-
vidual characteristics Zjt, and vjt and vjt are stochastic compo-
nents of income. Thus, log income is the sum of a deterministic
component that can be calibrated to capture the hump shape of
earnings over the life-cycle, and two random components, one
transitory and one persistent. The transitory component is cap-
tured by the shock vjt, an i.i.d. normally distributed random
variable with mean zero and variance sv
2. The persistent compo-
nent is assumed to be entirely permanent; it is captured by the
process vjt, which is assumed to follow a random walk:
(11) vjt 5 vj,t21 1 hjt,
where hjt is an i.i.d. normally distributed random variable with
mean zero and variance sh
2. These assumptions closely follow
Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout [1999] and other papers on the
buffer-stock model of savings.
We allow transitory labor income shocks, vjt, to be correlated
with innovations to the stochastic process for expected in￿ation,
et, and denote the corresponding coef￿cient of correlation w. To
the extent that wages are set in real terms, this correlation is
likely to be zero. If wages are set in nominal terms, however,
the correlation between real labor income and in￿ation may be
negative, and this can affect the form of the optimal mortgage
contract.
We model the tax code in the simplest possible way, by
considering a linear taxation rule. Gross labor income, Ljt, is
taxed at the constant tax rate t. We also allow for mortgage
interest deductibility at this rate.
The price of housing ￿uctuates over time. Let pjt
H denote the
date t real log price of house j. Real house price growth is given by
(12) Dpjt
H 5 g 1 djt,
a constant g plus an i.i.d. normally distributed shock djt with
mean zero and variance sd
2. To economize on state variables, we
assume that innovations to a household’s real house price are
perfectly positively correlated with innovations to the permanent
component of the household’s real labor income so that
1461 HOUSEHOLD RISK MANAGEMENT(13) djt 5 ahjt,
where a . 0. This assumption implies that states of the world
with low house prices are also states with low permanent labor
income; in these states an increase in required mortgage pay-
ments under an ARM contract can require costly adjustments in
consumption. In the next section we use PSID data to judge the
plausibility of this assumption.
6
House prices matter in our model because we impose the
realistic constraint, emphasized by Caplin, Freeman, and Tracy
[1997] and Chan [2001], that re￿nancing of a FRM is only possi-
ble if the value of the house, less the minimum downpayment,
exceeds the principal balance of the mortgage. In addition, we can
extend the model to allow households to obtain a second one-
period loan to bring total debt up to the value of the house less the
minimum downpayment. Recall that Djt is the nominal dollar
amount of the original loan outstanding at date t. We allow
households at time t to borrow Bjt nominal dollars for one period
subject to the constraint
(14) Bjt # ~1 2 l!Pjt
HH #
j 2 Djt.
That is, total borrowing cannot exceed the original proportion of
house value that could be borrowed at date 1. We assume that the
nominal interest rate on the second loan is equal to Y1t plus a
constant premium u
B.
In each period the household decides whether or not to de-
fault on the loan. In case of default the bank seizes the house and
the household is forced into the rental market for the remainder
of its life. We set the rental cost equal to the user cost of housing
plus a constant rental premium u
R. The real rental cost Zt for a
house of size H # with price Pt
H is given by
(15) Zt 5
@Y1t 2 Et~Dpt11
H 1 pt11! 1 u
R#Pt
HH #
Pt
,
where Y1,t is the one-period nominal interest rate, Et(Dpt11
H 1
p1,t11) is the expected proportional nominal change in the house
price, and Pt
HH # is the date t value of the house. The rental
premium covers the moral hazard problem of renting, that ten-
ants have no incentive to look after a property so that mainte-
6. A large positivecorrelationbetweenincomeshocks and houseprices is also
present in Ortalo-Magne ´ and Rady [2001].
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terest payments on a mortgage loan, the rental cost of housing is
not tax-deductible, which increases the after-tax cost of renting.
The date t real pro￿t of lenders of funds, or banks, depends
on whether there is default. For an ARM loan to a household with
no second loan, it is given by
(16) Pjt 5
~Pjt
HH #
j 2 Djt!Ijt
Z 1 u
ADjt~1 2 Ijt
Z!
Pt
,
where Ijt
Z is an indicator variable which takes the value of one if
the household defaults in period t and zero otherwise (of course
this variable is not de￿ned in case there has been default in a
period prior to t). In case of default the bank seizes the house but
loses the outstanding mortgage principal. If there is no default,
the bank receives the ARM premium on the outstanding loan. For
a FRM the household can also re￿nance the loan, in which case
interest payments cease, but the bank receives the outstanding
mortgage principal.
We introduce moving in the model in the following simple
manner: with probability p the household moves in each period.
When this happens, the household sells the house, pays off the
remaining mortgage, and evaluates utility of wealth using the
terminal utility function. This enables us to study the impact of
the likelihood of moving, or of termination of the mortgage con-
tract, on mortgage choice.
In summary,the household’s controlvariables are (Cjt,Bjt,Ijt
r,Ijt
Z)
at each date t. The problem is somewhat simpler in the case of
an ARM, because in this case the re￿nancing indicator variable
Ijt
r is not a control variable. The vector of state variables can be
written as Xjt 5 ~t,y1t,Wjt,Pt,y1,t9 j,t9 j,vjt,Sjt
Z! at each date t, where
y1,t9 j ~t9 j , t! is the level of nominal interest rates when the mort-
gage was initiated or was last re￿nanced, t9 j is the period when
the mortgage was initiated or was last re￿nanced, Wjt is real
liquid wealth or cash-on-hand, Pt is the date t price level, vjt is the
household’s permanent labor income, and Sjt
Z is a state variable
that takes the value of one if there has been previous default and
zero otherwise.
The equation describing the evolution of real cash-on-hand
for an ARM when there has not been previous default, and with
no second loan, can be written as
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Wj,t11 5 ~Wjt 2 Cjt 2 Mjt
A 1 tY1t
ADjt/Pt!~1 1 R1,t11! 1 ~1 2 t!Lj,t11,
or when there has been previous default,
(18) Wj,t11 5 ~Wjt 2 Cjt 2 Zjt!~1 1 R1,t11! 1 ~1 2 t!Lj,t11,
and similarly for a FRM.
This problem cannot be solved analytically. Given the ￿nite
nature of the problem, a solution exists and can be obtained by
backward induction. We discretize the state space and the choice
variables using equally spaced grids in the log scale. The density
functions for the random variables were approximated using
Gaussian quadrature methods to perform numerical integration
[Tauchen and Hussey 1991]. The nominal interest rate process
was approximated by a two-state transition probability matrix.
The grid points for these processes were chosen using Gaussian
quadrature. In period T 1 1 the utility function coincides with
the value function. In every period t prior to T 1 1, and for each
admissible combination of the state variables, we compute the
value associated with each combination of the choice variables.
This value is equal to current utility plus the expected discounted
continuation value. To compute this continuation value for points
which do not lie on the grid, we use cubic spline interpolation. The
combinations of the choice variables ruled out by the constraints
of the problem are given a very large (negative) utility such that
they are never optimal. We optimize over the different choices
using grid search.
II.B. Parameterization
We study the optimal consumption and mortgage choices of
investors who buy a house early in life. Adult age in our model
starts at age 26, and we let T be equal to 30 years. For compu-
tational tractability, we let each period in our model correspond
to two years, but we report annualized parameters and data
moments for ease of interpretation. In the baseline case we as-
sume an annual discount factor b equal to 0.98 and a coef￿cient
of relative risk aversion g equal to three. We will study how the
degree of risk aversion affects mortgage choice.
Parameter estimates for in￿ation and interest rates are re-
ported in Table I. Our measure of in￿ation is the consumer price
index. We use annual data from 1962 to 1999, time aggregated to
two-year periods, to estimate equation (2). We ￿nd average in￿a-
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percent, and an annual autoregressive coef￿cient of 0.754. To
measure the log real interest rate, we de￿ate the two-year nomi-
nal interest rate using the consumer price index. We measure the
variability of the ex ante real interest rate by regressing ex post
two-year real returns on lagged two-year real returns and two-
year nominal interest rates, and then calculating the variability
of the ￿tted value. We obtain a standard deviation of 2.2 percent
per year, as compared with a mean of 2.0 percent. This standard
TABLE I
CALIBRATED AND ESTIMATED PARAMETERS
Description Parameter Value
Risk aversion g 3
Discount factor b 0.98
House size ($ thousands) H # 125, 187.5
Downpayment ratio l 0.20
Tax rate t 0.20
Mean log in￿ation m 0.046
Standard deviation of log in￿ation s(p1t) 0.039
Autoregression parameter f 0.754
Mean log real yield r # 0.020
Standard deviation of real log yield s(r1t) 0.022
Nominal FRM premium u
F 0.018
Term premium j 0.010
Re￿nancing cost ($ thousands) r 1, `
ARM premium u
A 0.017
Second loan premium u
B `
Rental premium u
Z 0.030
Mean real house price growth exp (g 1 sd
2/2) 0.016
Standard deviation of log real house price
growth sd 0.115
Standard deviation of transitory income shocks sv 0.141, 0.248
Standard deviation of persistent income shocks sh 0.020
Correlation of transitory income and in￿ation
shocks w 0.000
All parameters are in annual terms. The interest rate measure is the one-yearTreasury bond rate from
1962 to 1999. The income and house price data are from the PSID from 1970 through 1992. Families that
werepart of the Surveyof EconomicOpportunitieswere droppedfrom the sample. Labor incomein each year
is de￿ned as total reported labor income plus unemployment compensation, workers compensation, social
security, supplemental social security, otherwelfare, child support, and total transfers, all this for both head
of household and if present his spouse. Labor income and reported house prices were de￿ated using the
Consumer Price Index.
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in our regression; but since our assumption that all real interest
rate risk is transitory arti￿cially diminishes the importance of
such risk, we use this high standard deviation to partially offset
this effect. Our results are not particularly sensitive to changes in
the volatility of the real interest rate.
In order to assess how well our model for the term structure
matches the data, we have computed the annualized standard
deviations of the two-year bond yield, the ten-year bond yield, and
the spread between them. The values we obtain are 5.3, 1.9, and
3.5 percent, respectively. The corresponding values in the data
are 3.1, 2.9, and 0.7 percent. It appears that our model overstates
the volatility of the short rate and understates its persistence,
which means that we understate the volatility of the long rate
level and overstate the volatility of the long-short yield spread.
In Section V on alternative parameterizations we assess the
bene￿ts of mortgage indexation when we calibrate our interest-
rate process to a process characteristic of the United States in the
1983–1999 period. As expected, the estimated parameters (re-
ported in Section V) imply considerably lower in￿ation risk in this
period.
Two important parameters of the mortgage contracts are the
mortgage premiums, u
F and u
A. It is natural to assume that u
F $
u
A. One can think of u
A as a pure measure of default risk, while
u
F contains both default risk and the value of the prepayment
option.
To estimate the mortgage premiums on the contracts, we use
data from the monthly interest rate survey of the Federal Hous-
ing Finance Board (FHFB) from January 1986 to December 2001.
To estimate the mortgage premium on FRM contracts, u
F, we
compute the difference between interest rates on commitments
for ￿xed-rate mortgages and the yield to maturity on ten-year
Treasury bonds. The average annual difference over this period is
1.8 percent.
To estimate the mortgage premium on ARM contracts, u
A, we
compute the difference between the ARM contract rate and the
yield on a one-year bond over the same sample period. The aver-
age annual difference is equal to 1.7 percent. This number may be
biased downward by the fact that ARMs sometimes have low
initial “teaser” rates to lure households into the ARM
commitment.
The difference between the ARM and FRM premiums is
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error in the survey data or the short sample period of the survey.
It may also result from the liquidity of the FRM market which has
been supported by U. S. government policy over many decades,
particularly through the activities of GNMA and the govern-
ment’s sponsorship of FNMA and FHLMC.
We set the term premium equal to 1.0 percent, the average
yield spread between ten-year and one-year Treasury bonds over
the period 1986–2001. This term premium increases the average
interest cost of FRMs relative to ARMs.
We assume a required downpayment of 20 percent, and we
set the rental premium u
Z to 3.0 percent. In the baseline case we
make u
B in￿nite and therefore do not allow the homeowner to
take out a second loan. We relax this restriction in Section V.
We use house price data from the PSID for the years 1970
through 1992. As with income the self-assessed value of the house
was de￿ated using the Consumer Price Index, with 1992 as the
base year, to obtain real house prices. We drop observations for
households who reported that they moved in the previous two
years since the house price reported does not correspond to the
same house. In order to deal with measurement error, we drop
the observations in the top and bottom 5 percent of real house
price changes.
We estimate the average real growth rate of house prices and
the standard deviation of innovations to this growth rate. Over
the sample period real house prices grew an average of 1.6 per-
cent per year. Part of this increase is due to improvements in the
quality of houses, which cannot be separated from other reasons
for house price appreciation using PSID data. The annualized
standard deviation of house price changes is 11.5 percent, a value
comparable to those reported by Case and Shiller [1989] and
Poterba [1991].
We consider two alternative house sizes. In the benchmark
case the household purchases a house costing $187,500 using a
$150,000 mortgage and paying $37,500 down. (The downpayment
is assumed to come from prior savings or transfers from family
members, rather than from current income.) In an alternative
case, the household purchases a smaller house costing $125,000
using a $100,000 mortgage and a $25,000 downpayment.
To estimate the income process, we follow Cocco, Gomes, and
Maenhout [1999]. We use the family questionnaire of the Panel
Study on Income Dynamics (PSID) to estimate labor income as a
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random sample, we drop families that are part of the Survey of
Economic Opportunities subsample. Only households with a male
head are used, as the age pro￿le of income may differ across male-
and female-headed households, and relatively few observations
are available for female-headed households. Retirees, nonrespon-
dents, students, and homemakers are also eliminated from the
sample.
Like Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout [1999] and Storesletten,
Telmer, and Yaron [2003], we use a broad de￿nition of labor
income so as to implicitly allow for insurance mechanisms—other
than asset accumulation—that households use to protect them-
selves against pure labor income risk. Labor income is de￿ned as
total reported labor income plus unemployment compensation,
workers compensation, social security, supplemental social secu-
rity, other welfare, child support, and total transfers (mainly help
from relatives), all this for both head of household and if present
his spouse. Observations which still reported zero for this broad
income category were dropped.
Labor income de￿ned this way is de￿ated using the Con-
sumer Price Index, with 1992 as the base year. The estimation
controls for family-speci￿c ￿xed effects. The function f(t,Zjt) is
assumed to be additively separable in t and Zjt. The vector Zjt of
personal characteristics, other than age and the ￿xed household
effect, includes marital status, household composition, and the
education of the head of the household.
7 Figure III shows the ￿t
of a third-order polynomial to the estimated age dummies for
singles and married couples with a high school education but no
college degree. We use these age pro￿les for our calibration exer-
cise. Average annual income for married couples is about 40
percent higher than income for singles, starting at around
$23,000 and peaking at $32,000. This means that a house of given
size is larger relative to income if it is owned by a single person.
The residuals obtained from the ￿xed-effects regressions of
log labor income on f(t,Zjt) can be used to estimate sh
2 and sv
2.
De￿ne l* jt as
(19) l* jt ; ljt 2 f~t,Zjt!.
7. Campbell, Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout [2001] estimate separate age
pro￿les for different educational groups. They also estimate different income
processes for households whose heads are employed in different industries, or
self-employed. In this version of the paper, we focus on a single representative
income process for simplicity.
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(20) l* jt 5 vjt 1 vjt.
Taking ￿rst differences,
(21) l* jt 2 l* j,t21 5 vjt 2 vj,t21 1 vjt 2 vj,t21 5 hjt 1 vjt 2 vj,t21.
We consider several alternative methods for calibrating the
standard deviations of the permanent and transitory shocks to
income. One approach is to use the standard deviation of income
innovations from (21), and the correlation between innovations to
income and real house price growth, to obtain estimates for the
standard deviations of hjt and vjt. The estimated correlation is
0.027, with a p-value of 2 percent. Recall that in the model, and
for tractability, we have assumed that real house price growth is
perfectly positively correlated with innovations to the persistent
component of income, and has zero correlation with purely tran-
sitory shocks. This assumption, and the standard deviation of
hjt 1 vjt 2 vj,t21, imply that sh and sv are 0.35 percent and 16.3
percent, respectively. This estimate of sh, the standard deviation
of permanent income shocks, seems too low. The reason is prob-
ably that measurement error biases our estimate of the correla-
tion between house price and income growth downward.
An alternative approach is to use household level data on
income growth over several periods to estimate sh and sv. Fol-
lowing Carroll [1992] and Carroll and Samwick [1997], Cocco,
FIGURE III
Labor Income Pro￿le
This ￿gure plots a ￿tted third-order polynomial to the estimated age dummies
for households composed of single individual and for a couple. The data are from
the PSID for the years 1970 through 1992.
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percent and 27.2 percent, respectively. Storesletten, Telmer, and
Yaron [2003] have reported similar numbers.
8
These numbers may be somewhat in￿ated by measurement
error in the PSID. A large standard deviation for permanent
income growth is particularly problematic for our model of mort-
gage choice because we assume a house of a ￿xed size and ignore
the possibility that the household will choose to move to a larger
or smaller house. This implies, for example, that our model will
tend to overpredict default rates when permanent income is
volatile.
To avoid this dif￿culty, we use a third calibration approach.
We assume that all shocks to permanent labor income are aggre-
gate shocks, so that idiosyncratic income risk is purely transitory.
This assumption is consistent with the fact that aggregate labor
income appears close to a random walk [Fama and Schwert 1977;
Jagannathan and Wang 1996]. In this case sh can be estimated,
as in Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout [1999], by averaging across all
individuals in our sample and taking the standard deviation of
the growth rate of average income. Following this procedure, we
estimate sh equal to 2.0 percent. For our baseline case we set sv
equal to 14.1 percent (20 percent over two years), which implies a
correlation of house price growth with total income growth of
about 0.1. Given the somewhat arbitrary nature of these deci-
sions, we are careful to do sensitivity analysis with respect to the
income growth parameters. We consider a higher transitory stan-
dard deviation of 24.8 percent (35 percent over two years) in the
tables reported below, and in addition we have recomputed some
results for a higher permanent standard deviation of 5 percent
with results similar to those reported.
In the baseline case we set the correlation between transitory
labor income shocks and innovations to expected in￿ation, w,
equal to zero.
The PSID contains information on total estimated federal
income taxes of the household. We use this variable to obtain an
estimate of t. Dividing total federal taxes by our broad measure of
labor income and computing the average across households, we
obtain an average tax rate of 10.3 percent. This number under-
8. There is a large literature in empirical labor economics that estimates
similarparameters, sometimesallowing them to vary over time. See, for example,
Abowd and Card [1989], Gottschalk and Mof￿tt [1994], or MaCurdy [1982].
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information on state taxes and because our model abstracts from
the progressivity of the income tax. To roughly compensate for
these biases, we set t equal to 20 percent. All the calibrated
parameters are summarized in Table I.
III. ALTERNATIVE NOMINAL MORTGAGES
We now use our model to compare ￿xed and adjustable rate
nominal mortgages. We do so by calculating optimal consumption
and re￿nancing plans, and the associated lifetime expected util-
ities, under alternative FRM and ARM contracts. We are particu-
larly interested in the effects of house size, income risk, and the
level of income on behavior and welfare. Accordingly, we consider
two alternative house sizes—$125,000 and $187,500, correspond-
ing to mortgages of $100,000 and $150,000, respectively—two
levels of transitory income risk—annual standard deviations of
0.141 and 0.248—and two income levels—calibrated for a couple
and a single person.
One way to get a sense for the size of these mortgages in
relation to income is to calculate the ratio of total mortgage
payments to income, both in the ￿rst year of the mortgage and
averaged over the life of the mortgage. We have done this for the
ARM, averaging across different levels of interest rates. For a
couple, the payment on a $100,000 mortgage amounts to 36
percent of income in the ￿rst year and 16 percent of income on
average over the life of the mortgage, while the payment on a
$150,000 mortgage is 53 percent of income initially and 24 per-
cent of income on average. For a single, these mortgages are more
burdensome. A $100,000 mortgage costs 50 percent of income
initially and 22 percent on average, while a $150,000 mortgage is
an extreme case that costs 75 percent of income initially and 33
percent on average.
As a ￿rst step toward a welfare analysis, Figure IV plots the
distribution of realized lifetime utility, based on simulation of the
model across 1,000 households. Each household is assumed to
have to ￿nance a $150,000 mortgage on a $187,500 home using
either an ARM, or an FRM with a $1,000 re￿nancing cost. In the
top panel of the ￿gure, the household has a couple’s income, while
in the bottom panel the household has a smaller single person’s
income. In both cases the lower standard deviation of income
growth, 0.141, is assumed.
1471 HOUSEHOLD RISK MANAGEMENTFigure IV shows that ARMs have substantial advantages for
most households. For couples, an ARM delivers higher utility
than a nominal FRM everywhere in the utility distribution. For
FIGURE IV
Benchmark Utility Distribution
This ￿gure shows various percentiles of the distributionof realizedutility when
we simulate the model for 1000 households. Panel A shows the results for house-
holds composed of a couple, and Panel B for households composed of a single
individual. The parameters of the model are given in Table I, with the size of the
house that needs to be ￿nanced equal to $187,500.The ￿gure illustrates utility for
an ARM and a nominal FRM with re￿nancing cost of $1000, an in￿ation-indexed
FRM whose real payments decline at the average rate of in￿ation, and an in￿a-
tion-indexed FRM with ￿xed real mortgage payments.
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the upper part of the utility distribution are better off with an
ARM, but a few households at the lower end of the distribution
are substantially worse off. These results re￿ect the chief disad-
vantage of an ARM, the cash-￿ow risk that ARM payments will
rise suddenly, exhausting buffer-stock savings and forcing an
unpleasant cutback in consumption. This risk is important when
the mortgage is large relative to income.
The cash-￿ow risk in ARM payments also implies that the
proportion of households who choose to default on each loan tends
to be higher under an ARM than under a FRM. Default rates are
extremely low for couples, but Figure V plots cumulative default
rates for singles with low income risk (dashed lines) and high
income risk (solid lines), respectively. It is important to note that
these default rates are obtained from simulating the behavior of
households who differ in their history of shocks to interest rates,
labor income and house prices. Households choose to default
when faced with negative labor income shocks, so that buffer-
stock savings become low, and with negative house price shocks,
FIGURE V
Cumulative Default and Mortgage Re￿nancing
This ￿gure shows the cumulative proportion of investors who choose to default
under the FRM and ARM contracts for a household composed of a single individ-
ual and for two levels of labor income risk. The parameters of the model are given
in Table I, with the size of the house that needs to be ￿nanced equal to $187,500.
The ￿gure also shows the cumulative proportion of households with low income
risk that re￿nance the FRM contract.
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which house prices and labor income shocks are mainly positive
(negative), default rates are lower (higher). Figure V shows cu-
mulative default over the life-cycle. Since the risk in mortgage
payments is higher early in life when buffer-stock savings are
smaller, default occurs mainly within the ￿rst eight years of the
contract.
There are some differences in the circumstances that trigger
default under each mortgage contract. While low labor income
and house prices trigger default for both types of contract, house-
holds with ARMs choose to default when current interest rates
and therefore current mortgage payments are high. They do so
because default allows them to avoid paying down the principal of
their mortgage, and this reduction in payments is particularly
valuable when interest rates are high. Households with FRMs, on
the other hand, choose to default when current interest rates are
low and expected to rise. In these circumstances borrowing con-
straints are more severe under the FRM contract than in the
rental market, because the FRM mortgage payment is based on
the long-term interest rate while the rental payment is based on
the current short-term interest rate.
Figure V also shows the cumulative re￿nancing of FRMs by
singles with low income risk. The re￿nancing rate is slightly
higher for singles with high income risk, and for couples, because
these households accumulate larger savings and thus are more
readily able to afford the $1,000 re￿nancing cost. Over the life of
the mortgage, about 45 percent of households re￿nance their
mortgages; almost all of this re￿nancing activity takes place
within the ￿rst twenty years of the mortgage, since late re￿nanc-
ing reduces interest payments on a smaller principal balance for
fewer years but incurs the same ￿xed cost as early re￿nancing.
The timing of re￿nancing is somewhat sensitive to the constraint
we have imposed, that homeowners must have positive home
equity in order to re￿nance. If we relax this constraint, we get
higher re￿nancing in the very early years of the mortgage, but the
difference diminishes over time and is only about 1 percentage
point after twelve years. This re￿ects the fact that house prices
increase on average, while outstanding mortgage principal dimin-
ishes, so that very few households are likely to have persistently
negative home equity.
Table II reports the average consumption growth rate and
the standard deviation of consumption growth for households
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FRMs without a re￿nancing option. The top panel of the table is
for a couple, while the bottom panel is for a single. Within each
panel we consider a small or large house, and low or high income
risk. Average consumption growth rates are very similar for all
mortgages, since they depend largely on the hump-shaped pro￿le
of labor income in the presence of borrowing constraints. In one
case with a large house relative to income, the average consump-
tion growth rate is higher for an ARM, re￿ecting precautionary
savings to guard against the cash-￿ow risk of the ARM. The form
of the mortgage has a larger effect on the volatility of consump-
tion growth. Volatility is lowest with an ARM, higher with a
re￿nancing FRM, and highest with a nonre￿nanceable FRM.
These numbers re￿ect the dominance of wealth risk over income
risk in determining consumption volatility over the life-cycle.
Table III summarizes the welfare implications of these num-
bers. The table reports the welfare provided by a FRM, with or
without a re￿nancing option, relative to an ARM. We calculate
welfare using a standard consumption-equivalent methodology.
For each mortgage contract we compute the constant consump-
TABLE II
CONSUMPTION GROWTH WITH NOMINAL MORTGAGES
Re￿nancing
Dct s(Dct)
ARM FRM
Yes
FRM
No
ARM FRM
Yes
FRM
No
Panel A: Couple
H # 5 125.0, sv 5 .141 1.5 1.5 1.5 12.1 13.6 13.7
H # 5 125.0, sv 5 .248 2.2 2.2 2.2 17.1 18.6 18.7
H # 5 187.5, sv 5 .141 2.0 2.0 1.9 13.9 15.6 15.9
H # 5 187.5, sv 5 .248 2.8 2.8 2.8 19.4 20.7 20.9
Panel B: Single
H # 5 125.0, sv 5 .141 1.9 1.9 1.8 13.5 15.2 15.5
H # 5 125.0, sv 5 .248 2.8 2.8 2.8 17.6 18.8 19.0
H # 5 187.5, sv 5 .141 3.0 2.9 2.8 17.9 19.5 20.0
H # 5 187.5, sv 5 .248 4.1 4.1 4.1 22.4 24.2 24.7
This table shows average annual consumption growth, for goods other than housing, and the standard
deviation of annual consumption growth under different mortgage contracts and for different parameter
con￿gurations. The data are obtained by simulating the model in Section II. Annual average consumption
growth and the standard deviation of annual consumption growth are obtained by dividing the two-year
values by two and square root of two, respectively. The FRM contract can allow for re￿nancing at a $1000
cost, or can prohibit re￿nancing. Panel A shows the results for households composed of a couple, and Panel
B shows the results for households composed of a single individual.
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utility terms, and then measure the percentage change in this
equivalent consumption stream across mortgage contracts. In all
the cases we consider, the ARM is the best available mortgage
contract. The welfare consequences of this can be very large,
re￿ecting the importance of the mortgage decision in the ￿nancial
life of a household. If we consider a couple with low income risk
and a large $187,500 house as a benchmark case, the couple is
5.96 percent worse off with a nominal FRM that allows cheap
re￿nancing, and 6.79 percent worse off with a FRM that prohibits
re￿nancing.
The welfare advantage of the ARM diminishes when the
house is large relative to income and when income is volatile. In
the extreme case of a single with high income risk and a large
house, the household is only 1.03 percent worse off with a re￿-
nanceable FRM than with an ARM. This re￿ects the fact that the
cash-￿ow risk of an ARM is disproportionately more important
when labor income is risky and the house is large relative to
income.
TABLE III
WELFARE ANALYSIS OF NOMINAL MORTGAGES
Re￿nancing
FRM
Re￿nancing option Yes No
Panel A: Couple
H # 5 125.0, sv 5 .141 26.34 26.84 0.50
H # 5 125.0, sv 5 .248 25.72 26.32 0.59
H # 5 187.5, sv 5 .141 25.96 26.79 0.83
H # 5 187.5, sv 5 .248 25.40 26.31 0.91
Panel B: Single
H # 5 125.0, sv 5 .141 25.77 26.51 0.74
H # 5 125.0, sv 5 .248 25.43 26.20 0.76
H # 5 187.5, sv 5 .141 25.71 27.29 1.58
H # 5 187.5, sv 5 .248 21.03 23.16 2.13
This table shows the mean welfare gain deliveredby a nominal FRM, with and without re￿nancing at a
$1000 cost, relative to an ARM. The data are obtained by simulating the model in Section II. Welfare is
reported in the form of standard consumption-equivalentvariations. We weight the different states by the
ergodic or steady-state distribution. For each mortgage contract we compute the constant consumption
stream that makes the household as well off in expected utility terms. Utility losses are then obtained by
measuring the percentagechange in this equivalentconsumption stream across mortgage contracts. Panel A
shows the results for households composed of a couple, and Panel B shows the results for households
composed of a single individual. The last column shows the value of the option to re￿nance obtained as the
welfare difference for the re￿nancing and no re￿nancing versions of the FRM.
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re￿nancing costs, we can obtain the value of the option to re￿-
nance. In the benchmark case this option is worth 0.83 percent of
consumption; it becomes more valuable when the house is large
relative to income, and when income is risky. Note that these
numbers assume a ￿xed FRM rate even while changing the cost
of re￿nancing, and thus they do not impose a zero-pro￿t condition
on mortgage lenders.
All the numbers in Table III are averages across states of the
world with high and low interest rates. We have also calculated
expected utility conditional on an initial interest rate. As one
would expect, the ARM is even more advantageous if the interest
rate is initially low, since in this case the ARM has a lower cost in
the early years when borrowing constraints are most severe. The
FRM is more attractive if the interest rate is initially high; in the
benchmark case a couple will slightly prefer an ARM even with a
high initial interest rate, but a single will strongly prefer a FRM.
Thus, our model implies that households’ ￿nancing decisions
should be sensitive to the slope of the term structure. As we
discussed in the Introduction, the time-series behavior of U. S.
mortgage ￿nancing does not match this prediction. However, our
ability to explore this issue is limited by the fact that our dis-
cretized model allows only two possible levels of interest rates.
Using (16), we have calculated the average annual pro￿t of
lenders of funds under each mortgage contract, assuming that the
bank borrowsfunds at the one-periodriskless interest rate. In the
benchmark case of a couple with low income risk and a large
house, the average annual pro￿t is $745 for the ARM and $1218
for a re￿nanceable FRM. The higher average pro￿t on the FRM
comes from the term premium that banks earn by borrowing
short and lending long; of course, this term premium can be
regarded as compensation for the risk that banks take when they
mismatch the maturity of their borrowing and lending.
IV. INFLATION-INDEXED MORTGAGES
In this section we investigate the welfare properties of in￿a-
tion-indexed mortgages. In principle, an in￿ation-indexed FRM
can offer the wealth stability of an ARM, together with the in-
come stability of an FRM; it should thereforebe a superior vehicle
for household risk management.
We consider in￿ation-indexed FRM contracts in which the
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ties of a standard in￿ation-indexed FRM contract, with constant
real mortgage payments, and also those of an in￿ation-indexed
mortgage whose real payments diminish at the average rate of
in￿ation. We do so because our investor is borrowing constrained;
one of the advantages of the standard in￿ation-indexed FRM
contract, relative to the nominal FRM and ARM contracts, is that
real payments are lower early in life, when borrowing constraints
are more severe. This advantage of the standard in￿ation-in-
dexed contract is conceptually distinct from the risk-sharing ad-
vantage of indexation. Thus, to obtain a pure measure of the
risk-sharing advantage of indexation, we consider an in￿ation-
indexed mortgage whose real payments diminish at the average
rate of in￿ation.
If in period 1 household j chooses an in￿ation-indexed FRM
with ￿xed real payments, and the current real interest rate on an
in￿ation-indexed FRM contract with maturity T is RT1
I , then in
each subsequent period the household must make a real mort-
gage payment, Mjt
I , of
(22) Mjt
I 5
~1 2 l!Pj1
HHj
Sj51
T ~1 1 RT,1
I !
2j .
Real mortgage payments are ￿xed at mortgage initiation, and
nominal payments increase in proportion to the price level Pt.
Thus, unlike a nominal FRM, the real capital value of an in￿a-
tion-indexed mortgage is not sensitive to in￿ation.
For the in￿ation-indexed mortgage contract, we ignore the
possibility of re￿nancing. Given our assumption that real interest
rate variation is transitory, the gains from re￿nancing in our
model would be fairly small, and even a small monetary re￿nanc-
ing cost would prevent households from exercising their option. In
reality, even with persistent real interest rates, the possibility of
re￿nancing an in￿ation-indexed contract is likely to be only a
minor feature of the contract, given the low volatility of the real
interest rate compared with that of nominal yields.
We assume that the date t real interest rate on an in￿ation-
indexed FRM is given by
(23) RT2t11,t
I 5 RT2t11,t 1 u
I,
where u
I is a constant mortgage premium over the yield on a (T 2
t 1 1)-period real bond, RT2t11,t, which is determined by the
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interest rates. We assume that there is no log term premium for
long-term real bonds; that is, that the real term structure is ￿at
on average. This is consistent with the observed behavior of real
yields on Treasury in￿ation-protected securities since their issue
in 1997 [Roll 2003]. Since we do not allow for the possibility of
re￿nancing the in￿ation-indexed FRM contract we set u
I equal to
the ARM premium of 1.7 percent. This premium compensates the
mortgage lender for the initiation cost of the mortgage and for
default risk.
In the in￿ation-indexed mortgage with real payments which
diminish at the average rate of in￿ation, we have that
(24) Mjt
D 5 Mj,t21
D /~1 1 m!,
where Mjt
D is the date t real mortgage payment and m is average
in￿ation. The interest rate or internal rate of return for this
mortgage contract is assumed to be equal to that for the standard
in￿ation-indexed FRM.
The standard in￿ation-indexed mortgage with constant real
payments eases the household’s borrowing constraints. The real
payments under this contract are lower than the required real
payments on nominal mortgages early in life, when borrowing
constraints are more severe. A measure of the degree to which
investors are borrowing constrained is consumption growth. Ta-
ble IV shows that in the benchmark case the average consump-
tion growth rate under the in￿ation-indexed contract with con-
stant real payments is only 0.8 percent compared with 2.0 percent
with an ARM or a nominal FRM. Because the in￿ation-indexed
mortgage allows households to remain in debt later in life, it
increases the effect of income risk on consumption; thus, the
standard deviation of consumption growth is actually higher with
this contract than with an ARM.
The in￿ation-indexed mortgage with declining real payments
has a much smaller effect on average consumption growth. There
is some reduction in the average consumption growth rate for
households with high income risk and large houses, re￿ecting the
fact that known real mortgage payments require smaller buffer
stocks and generate less precautionary saving than the random
real payments required by ARMs. The major effect of an in￿ation-
indexed mortgage with declining real payments is to reduce the
volatility of consumption growth, since this mortgage eliminates
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the ARM.
The in￿ation-indexed FRM also reduces default risk. For the
parameter values we have considered, households with in￿ation-
indexed mortgages never default. Average annual pro￿ts of lend-
ers are $1081 for the standard in￿ation-indexed mortgage, and
$971 for the mortgage with declining real payments. These pro￿ts
are higher than those for the ARM. In equilibrium these lower
default rates and higher pro￿ts might be translated into lower
in￿ation-indexed mortgage premiums, which would further
bene￿t households.
Figure IV plots the distribution of realized lifetime utility for
households with in￿ation-indexed FRMs with constant or declin-
ing real payments. The ￿gure shows that the welfare gains of
in￿ation-indexed mortgages are substantial for both couples and
singles. The gains are particularly large for households at the
bottom of the welfare distribution, but there are bene￿ts to house-
holds across the distribution. The in￿ation-indexed mortgage
TABLE IV
CONSUMPTION GROWTH WITH INFLATION-INDEXED MORTGAGES
Dct s(Dct)
ARM
In￿ation-indexed
FRM ARM
In￿ation-indexed
FRM
Constant Declining Constant Declining
Panel A: Couple
H # 5 125.0, sv 5 .141 1.5 0.8 1.5 12.1 11.7 12.0
H # 5 125.0, sv 5 .248 2.2 1.5 2.1 17.1 17.4 18.2
H # 5 187.5, sv 5 .141 2.0 0.8 1.9 13.9 12.9 14.4
H # 5 187.5, sv 5 .248 2.8 1.6 2.6 19.4 18.5 19.1
Panel B: Single
H # 5 125.0, sv 5 .141 1.9 0.8 1.8 13.5 12.5 13.5
H # 5 125.0, sv 5 .248 2.8 1.7 2.7 17.6 15.9 17.6
H # 5 187.5, sv 5 .141 2.9 0.8 2.6 17.9 14.7 17.5
H # 5 187.5, sv 5 .248 4.1 1.9 3.7 22.4 18.4 22.2
This table shows average annual consumption growth, for goods other than housing, and the standard
deviation of annual consumption growth under different mortgage contracts and for different parameter
con￿gurations. A standard ARM contract is comparedwith two alternative in￿ation-indexedFRMs, one with
constant real paymentsand onewith real paymentsthat decline at the average rate of in￿ation. The data are
obtained by simulating the model in Sections II and IV. Annual average consumption growth and the
standard deviation of annual consumption growth are obtained by dividing the two-year values by two and
square root of two, respectively. Panel A shows the results for households composedof a couple, and Panel B
shows the results for households composed of a single individual.
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with declining real payments.
Table V shows the average welfare gains of the in￿ation-
indexed mortgages relative to the ARM in the form of standard
consumption-equivalent variations. For ease of reference the ear-
lier comparison of the nominal FRM with the ARM is repeated
here. In the benchmark case of a couple with a $187,500 house
and low income risk, the in￿ation-indexed mortgage with con-
stant real payments offers a welfare gain over an ARM equivalent
to 3.95 percent of consumption. The welfare gain increases with
house size and with income risk, since ARMs are particularly
problematic with large houses and risky income. In the extreme
case of a single with a large house and high income risk, the
welfare gain of in￿ation indexation exceeds 36 percent of
consumption.
Comparing the two in￿ation-indexed contracts, we see that
the average welfare gains of the contract with declining real
mortgage payments are considerably smaller than those of the
mortgage contract with ￿xed real payments, but they remain
TABLE V
WELFARE ANALYSIS OF INFLATION-INDEXED MORTGAGES
Nominal FRM In￿ation-indexed FRM
Constant Declining
Panel A: Couple
H # 5 125.0, sv 5 .141 26.34 1.40 0.12
H # 5 125.0, sv 5 .248 25.72 2.22 0.24
H # 5 187.5, sv 5 .141 25.96 3.95 0.91
H # 5 187.5, sv 5 .248 25.40 7.40 2.39
Panel B: Single
H # 5 125.0, sv 5 .141 25.77 3.49 0.67
H # 5 125.0, sv 5 .248 25.43 6.69 1.69
H # 5 187.5, sv 5 .141 25.71 15.86 7.30
H # 5 187.5, sv 5 .248 21.03 36.42 16.05
This table shows the mean welfare gain deliveredby a nominal FRM and by an in￿ation-indexedFRM,
with constant real payments and with real payments which diminish at the average rate of in￿ation, relative
to an ARM. The data are obtained by simulating the model in Sections II and IV. Welfare is reportedin the
form of standard consumption-equivalent variations. We weight the different states by the ergodic or
steady-state distribution. For each mortgage contract we compute the constant consumption stream that
makes the householdas well off in expected utility terms. Utility losses are then obtained by measuring the
percentage change in this equivalent consumption stream across mortgage contracts. Panel A shows the
results for households composed of a couple, and Panel B shows the results for households composed of a
single individual.
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V shows that households are on average 0.91 percent better off
with a declining in￿ation-indexed FRM than with an ARM. Again
the welfare gains increase dramatically with house size and in-
come risk.
These results imply that, with substantial in￿ation risk of
the sort we have estimated for the 1962–1999 period, the risk-
sharing advantages of indexation are very large. Households
would be able to manage their lifetime risks much more effec-
tively if they had access to in￿ation-indexed mortgage contracts.
Of course, these results depend on the parameters we have esti-
mated. In the next section we assess the bene￿ts of mortgage
indexation for alternative parameterizations, including an in-
come process in which nominal wages are temporarily sticky, and
an interest-rate process characteristic of the United States in the
recent period of declining in￿ation.
V. ALTERNATIVE PARAMETERIZATIONS
When nominal wages are in￿ation-indexed, or equivalently
when wages are ￿xed in real terms, the correlation between real
labor income shocks and in￿ation shocks is zero. We have as-
sumed this in our benchmark parameterization. However, in a
world where implicit contracts tend to ￿x nominal, but not real
wages, the correlation between in￿ation shocks and real labor
income shocks is negative. In such a world households may de-
mand nominal mortgage contracts because their wage contracts
are nominal. To explore this coordination feature of nominal
contracts, we compute the welfare bene￿ts of in￿ation-indexed
mortgages when nominal wages are sticky.
Table VI repeats the welfare comparison of nominal and
in￿ation-indexed FRMs with ARMs for several alternative speci-
￿cations. We consider the benchmark case of a couple with a large
$187,500 house and low income risk. The ￿rst row of the table
repeats the numbers from Table V for this case. The second row
shows the average welfare gains of nominal and in￿ation-indexed
FRMs for a negative correlation coef￿cient of 21 between tempo-
rary real labor income shocks and in￿ation innovations. In the
presence of negative correlation, a nominal ARM becomes much
less attractive because positive in￿ation shocks drive up nominal
interest rates and increase mortgage payments at times when
real labor income is temporarily low. A nominal FRM becomes
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ported in Table VI it does not dominate the ARM.
Negative correlation makes an in￿ation-indexed mortgage
less attractive relative to a nominal FRM. The welfare difference
between the in￿ation-indexed FRM with declining real payments
and the nominal FRM is 6.87 percent in the benchmark case with
a zero correlation, but only 4.68 percent with a correlation of 21.
However, the in￿ation-indexed mortgage becomes more attrac-
tive relative to the ARM, which is particularly disfavored by
nominal wage stickiness.
While these results are qualitatively unsurprising, it is strik-
ing that temporary nominal wage stickiness does not reverse the
welfare ordering we found in the previous section, that in￿ation-
TABLE VI
WELFARE ANALYSIS UNDER ALTERNATIVE PARAMETERIZATIONS
Nominal
FRM
In￿ation-indexed
FRM
Constant Declining
1. Benchmark 25.96 3.95 0.91
2. Correlated income and in￿ation (w 5 21.00) 22.87 5.16 1.81
3. 1983–1999 parameters 26.94 1.01 0.02
4. Lower second loan premium (u
B 5 0.01) 26.40 1.57 0.97
5. Higher moving probability (p 5 0.10) 26.60 8.94 0.86
6. Lower rental premium (u
Z 5 0.02) 26.08 3.83 0.85
7. Higher rental premium (u
Z 5 0.04) 25.79 4.14 1.09
8. Higher time discount rate (b 5 0.90) 26.49 12.46 1.46
9. Higher risk aversion (g 5 5) 21.33 8.12 4.58
10. More volatile permanent income (sh 5 0.05) 25.11 2.17 0.90
11. Hybrid ARM contract 26.75 3.09 0.07
12. Correlated income and real rates 25.90 4.02 0.97
13. Term premium in the real term structure 25.96 21.34 23.72
This table shows the mean welfare gain deliveredby a nominal FRM and by an in￿ation-indexedFRM,
with constant real payments and with real payments which diminish at the average rate of in￿ation, relative
to an ARM for differentparameterizations.The data are obtained by simulating the model in Sections II and
IV. The ￿rst row shows the results for our benchmark case, which is a couple needing to ￿nance a house of
$187,500 and facing labor income risk sv 5 .141. The second shows the results for a correlation between
transitory labor income and in￿ation shocks equal to minus one. The third row shows the results when the
parameters of the in￿ation and real interest rate processes are calibrated using data for the 1983–1999
period. The annual parameters are m 5 .034, s(p1t) 5 .012, f 5 .412, r # 5 .031, and s(r1t) 5 .016. In the
fourth row we allow homeowners to take out second loans if they have positive home equity, with a second
loan premiumof 1 percent.The ￿fth row shows the results for a probability of moving equal to 10 percent.The
sixth and seventhrowsshow the results for a lowerand a higherrentalpremiumin case of default. The eighth
row shows the results for a higher time discount rate, corresponding to a lower time discount factor of 0.90.
The ninth row shows the results for a higher coef￿cient of relative risk aversion. The tenth row shows the
results for a higherstandard deviation for permanent income shocks. The eleventhrow shows the results for
a hybrid ARM characterized by a 2 percentcap per year and a 6 percent lifetime cap. The twelfth row shows
the results for a correlation of income growth and real interest rate shocks equal to 20.2. The last row shows
the results assuming that the term premiumof 1 percentis in the realterm structure ratherthan the nominal
term structure.
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FRMs. To reverse that ordering, we would need to assume
nominal stickiness in the permanent component of labor income,
which would imply that in￿ation shocks permanently reduce real
labor income. Such an assumption is much more extreme than
the temporary nominal stickiness we consider here.
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler [2000] and Campbell and Viceira
[2001] report considerably lower in￿ation risk during the period
since 1983 in which Federal Reserve Chairmen Paul Volcker and
Alan Greenspan have brought U. S. in￿ation under control. We
now assess the bene￿ts of mortgage indexation when we calibrate
our interest-rate process to a process characteristic of the United
States in the 1983–1999 period. For this period we ￿nd lower
average in￿ation (3.4 percent as compared with 4.6 percent), less
volatile in￿ation (a standard deviation of 1.2 percent as compared
with 3.9 percent), less persistent in￿ation (an autoregressive
parameter of 0.41 as compared with 0.75), a higher average real
interest rate (3.1 percent as compared with 2.0 percent), and a
less volatile real interest rate (a standard deviation of 1.6 percent
as compared with 2.2 percent).
The third row of Table VI changes the interest-rate pa-
rameters to those we calibrate for the 1983–1999 period. The ￿rst
column shows that nominal FRMs are less attractive relative to
ARMs than was the case in our benchmark model. Evidently, the
stabilization of in￿ation and interest rates has reduced the in-
come risk of ARMs relatively more than the wealth risk of FRMs.
The second and third columns show that in￿ation-indexed FRMs
remain superior mortgage contracts, but the welfare gain is ex-
tremely small for the in￿ation-indexed FRM with declining real
payments. It appears that the Volcker-Greenspan monetary pol-
icy has reduced the pure risk management advantages of in￿a-
tion-indexed bonds to a low level.
We now study how allowing homeowners to take out second
loans, if they have positive home equity, affects the bene￿ts of
mortgage indexation. The fourth row of Table VI shows the wel-
fare gains for a second loan premium, u
B, of 1 percent in annual
terms. For tractability, in this case we eliminate the prepayment
option on the nominal FRM. We see that the bene￿ts of constant
real payments are smaller when second loans are allowed, since
these loans are an alternative way to relax the household’s bor-
rowing constraints. However, second loans do not entirely elimi-
nate the income risk of ARMs, because low house prices may
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loans are unavailable precisely when they would be most valu-
able. Thus, our basic results survive the addition of second loans
to our model.
In the ￿fth row of Table VI we solve our model assuming a
moving probability equal to 0.10, meaning that the household
moveson average once every ten years. Recall that in all the cases
reported in earlier tables, the probability of moving is equal to
zero. We ￿nd that the welfare gain of an ARM over a nominal
FRM is higher when the moving probability is higher. If a home-
owner knows he is highly likely to move in the near future, he is
more likely to use the kind of mortgage that has the lower current
interest rate. On average, this is the ARM or the in￿ation-in-
dexed FRM since the nominal FRM has a higher yield spread that
re￿ects the slope of the nominal term structure.
Our results are sensitive to the assumption that we make
about consumption in the event of a mortgage default. In the
model we assume that in case of default the bank seizes the house
and the household is forced into the rental market for the remain-
der of its life. We set the rental premium equal to the user cost of
housing plus a constant rental premium, u
R, which in the bench-
mark parameterization is equal to 3 percent. The sixth and sev-
enth rows of Table VI considerlowervalues and a higher value for
the rental premium of 2 percent and 4 percent, respectively. We
interpret these as roughly capturing the effects of different de-
fault costs or exemption levels in the event of personal bank-
ruptcy. Table VI shows that cheaper default makes a nominal
FRM less attractive relative to an ARM, because it mitigates the
income risk of the ARM. The bene￿ts of FRM indexation are also
reduced but remain substantial. Naturally, the cheaper is default
the higher is the default rate.
These results suggest that in states or countries where bank-
ruptcy is relatively cheaper one should observe, ceteris paribus, a
higher proportion of households choosing ARMs. However, we
do not adjust the ARM premium u
A to compensate lenders for
variations in the default rate caused by variations in the rental
premium, and thus our results do not capture the full general
equilibrium effect of the bankruptcy code.
In the eighth row of Table VI we consider impatient investors
with a higher time discount rate and a correspondingly smaller
time discount factor of 0.90. Such investors accumulate a smaller
buffer stock of liquid ￿nancial assets, so they default more often
1485 HOUSEHOLD RISK MANAGEMENTand are more affected by the wealth risk of nominal FRMs and
the income risk of ARMs. They gain more from in￿ation-indexa-
tion, even if real payments decline over time. They particularly
bene￿t from the postponed payments of an in￿ation-indexed FRM
with constant real payments.
In the ninth row of the table, we increase the risk aversion
coef￿cient from 3 to 5. This causes households to become more
concerned about the income risk of ARMs. The welfare advantage
of ARMs over nominal FRMs diminishes, and the bene￿ts of
in￿ation-indexation increase. Much of the gain from in￿ation-
indexation comes from improved risk management, but these
households also have a strong preference for smooth consumption
so they bene￿t from declining real mortgage payments.
The tenth row of Table VI shows the results for a higher
standard deviation of permanent income shocks equal to 5 per-
cent. The results are qualitatively similar to those for the bench-
mark case. The main quantitative difference is a reduced bene￿t
of an in￿ation-indexed mortgage with constant real payments.
This change is explained by the fact that with risky permanent
income, the option to default becomes more valuable for the ARM
and nominal FRM contracts relative to the in￿ation-indexed
mortgage with constant real payments. Once again, we do not
adjust the ARM or FRM premium for variations in default caused
by the change in the volatility of income, and thus our results
re￿ect only a partial equilibrium, not a general equilibrium
analysis.
In the eleventh row of Table VI, we consider a hybrid ARM in
which there is a cap of 2 percent on the annual increase in the
interest rate, and a lifetime cap of 6 percent on the cumulative
interest rate increase after mortgage initiation. These terms are
fairly standard ones for a hybrid ARM. The hybrid ARM is more
attractive than either a straight ARM or a nominal FRM, as it
mitigates income risk while still limiting wealth risk. The bene-
￿ts of mortgage indexation are smaller in comparison to a hybrid
ARM, and shrink to 7 basis points for an in￿ation-indexed mort-
gage with declining real payments.
In practice, ARMs often have more complicated terms includ-
ing a low initial teaser rate. A teaser rate enables an ARM to
capture some of the bene￿ts of an in￿ation-indexed mortgage
with constant real payments, but we do not attempt to capture
the full richness of available ARM contracts here.
Our benchmark modelassumes that shocks to income growth
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instead that income growth is negatively correlated with real
interest rates, this exacerbates the income risk of ARMs, since
income will tend to be low precisely when interest rates are high
and required ARM mortgage payments are high. The twelfth row
of Table VI shows that with a correlation of 20.2 between income
and real interest rates, nominal and in￿ation-indexed FRMs be-
come slightly more attractive relative to ARMs.
The last row of Table VI assumes that the term premium of
1 percent applies to the real term structure as well as the nominal
term structure. In this case the spread between long-term nomi-
nal and real interest rates is caused only by expected in￿ation
and does not include an in￿ation risk premium. This increases
the cost of an in￿ation-indexed mortgage relative to a nominal
mortgage, and reduces the bene￿t of indexation. Under this as-
sumption an ARM looks attractive as a way for a homeowner to
avoid paying the term premium.
Finally, we consider an alternative speci￿cation in which we
allow households who choose a nominal ARM to subsequently
re￿nance into a nominal FRM. Recall that our baseline speci￿-
cation compares a nominal ARM to a nominal FRM, without
allowing households to switch between the two. In practice, and
eventhough there are transaction costs associated with switching
between different types of mortgages, it is possible to do so. The
complexity of our model prevents us from considering a period-
by-period decision to switch mortgages. However, we can study
the welfare effects of allowing a one-time switch from a nominal
ARM to a nominal FRM. It may be the case that ARM borrowers
￿nd it optimal to choose the ARM when interestrates are low, but
plan to switch to a FRM if and when interest rates increase.
The solution to this alternative speci￿cation requires that at
each date t and for each combination of the state variables, we
compare the utility of remaining an ARM borrower to the utility
of switching to the FRM contract. More precisely, let Vt(Xt; FRM)
denote the lifetime utility of becoming an FRM borrower at date
t, when the vector of state variables is given by Xt. Assuming a
zero switching cost, the household will at date t switch to the
FRM if and only if Vt(Xt; FRM) . Vt(Xt; ARM), where Vt(Xt;
ARM) is the lifetime utility of remaining an ARM borrower with
the option to switch to the FRM in a subsequent period.
To solve for the optimal mortgage choices under this alter-
native speci￿cation, we set the parameters equal to their bench-
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most borrowers prefer an ARM and never switch to a FRM. There
are 1.3 percent of households who start off with an ARM and later
on switch to a FRM when current interest rates are high. How-
ever, not all households￿nd it optimal to switch to the FRM when
current rates are high; only those with low current income and
￿nancial wealth do so. The intuition for this result is simple:
when current interest rates are high the ARM implies a larger
current mortgage payment than the FRM. Those consumers who
are more borrowing constrained ￿nd it optimal to pay the higher
average premium on the FRM in exchange for the lower current
mortgage payments. This result illustrates once more the impor-
tance of borrowing constraints for mortgage choice. As consumers
grow older, the labor income pro￿le becomes ￿atter, and house-
holds become less borrowing constrained. For this reason the
bene￿ts of switching to the FRM contract are lower. This explains
our ￿nding that for the baseline parameters all the switching
from the ARM to the FRM takes place before age 38.
We also study the welfare effects of allowing consumers to
switch from the ARM to the FRM. We compute the mean welfare
gain delivered by the ARM with the option to switch to the FRM,
relative to the baseline nominal ARM contract. We ￿nd a modest
welfare gain of 0.27 percent, re￿ecting the small number of
households that choose to make this switch.
VI. CONCLUSION
The problem of mortgage choice is both basic and complex. It
is basic because almost every middle-class American faces this
choice at least once in his or her life. It is complex because it
involves many considerations that are at the frontier of ￿nance
theory: uncertainty in in￿ation and interest rates, borrowing
constraints, illiquid assets, uninsurable risk in labor income, and
the need to plan over a long horizon.
Despite the complexity of the problem, it is important for
￿nancial economists to try to offer scienti￿cally grounded advice.
If ￿nancial economists avoid the topic, homeowners may be
guided by unwise commercial or journalistic advice; for example,
they may be urged to time the bond market by predicting the
direction of long-term interest rates. Mortgage choice should not
be left to specialists in real estate, but should be treated as an
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heart of ￿nance.
In this paper we have shown that the form of the mortgage
contract can have large effects on household welfare. We begin by
comparing pure forms of the standard nominal ARM and FRM
contracts. FRM contracts expose households to wealth risk, while
ARM contracts expose them to income risk: the risk that borrow-
ing constraints will bind more severely when high interest rates
coincide with low income and house prices. While the exact levels
of welfare depend on the particular premiums we have assumed
for ARM and FRM mortgages, we can draw general conclusions
about the types of households that should be more likely to use
ARMs. Households with smaller houses relative to income, more
stable income, lower risk aversion, more lenient treatment in
bankruptcy, and a higher probability of moving should be the
households that ￿nd ARMs most attractive.
Interestingly, these results match quite well with empirical
evidence reported by Shilling, Dhillon, and Sirmans [1987]. These
authors look at micro data on mortgage borrowing and estimate a
reduced-form econometric model of mortgage choice. They ￿nd
that households with coborrowers and married couples (whose
household income is presumably more stable) and households
with a higher moving probability are more likely to use ARMs.
We have also investigated the welfare properties of innova-
tive in￿ation-indexed mortgage contracts. An in￿ation-indexed
FRM can offer the wealth stability of an ARM together with the
income stability of an FRM, so it is a superior vehicle for house-
hold risk management. Using U. S. data from the period 1962–
1999, we ￿nd very large welfare gains from the availability of an
in￿ation-indexed mortgage contract. Some of these gains arise
from the reduced mortgage payments early in the life of the
mortgage that are implied by a constant real payment as opposed
to a constant nominal payment. Even if we removethis advantage
by requiring real payments that decline at the expected rate of
in￿ation, we still ￿nd substantial welfare gains from indexation.
This ￿nding raises the question of why in￿ation-indexed
mortgages are not more commonly used. There are several pos-
sible answers to this question. First, the yield spreads between
in￿ation-indexed Treasury securities and nominal Treasury se-
curities have been extremelylow, generally below 2 percent, since
in￿ation-indexed Treasury securities were introduced in 1997
[Roll 2003]. This suggests that investors have a high degree of
1489 HOUSEHOLD RISK MANAGEMENTcon￿dence that in￿ation will remain low in the future, and that
the in￿ation risk premium is low. When we calibrate our interest-
rate model to the period since 1983 in which in￿ation has been
relatively well controlled, or when we assume a zero in￿ation risk
premium, we ￿nd smaller risk management bene￿ts of indexa-
tion. Second, we ￿nd that hybrid ARMs with nominal interest
rate caps can improve signi￿cantly over pure ARMs. These ARMs
reduce the bene￿ts of in￿ation-indexation.
Third, in￿ation-indexed mortgages can cause the outstand-
ing principal of the mortgage to increase over time in nominal
terms (although not in real terms). Financial advisers frequently
warn against such “negative amortization,” without making any
distinction between real and nominal debt. Irwin [1996], for ex-
ample, writes “Another trap has to do with negative amortization.
Some of the adjustable loans keep the monthly payments down by
adding the interest to the principal. In other words, you end up
owing more than you borrowed!” Even more colorfully, Tyson and
Brown [2000] write “Negative amortization has the potential to
be a personal ￿nancial neutron bomb. It destroys the borrower
without harming the property. If you’re offered an ARM with
negative amortization, emphatically say NO!”
9 Suspicion of nega-
tive amortization may have inhibited acceptance of innovative
mortgage contracts that might reduce the income risk of standard
ARMs.
Although our model captures many of the important factors
that should in￿uence mortgage choice, it remains oversimpli￿ed
in several important respects.First, we have assumed that house-
holds remain in a house of ￿xed size unless they are randomly
forced to move, in which case we evaluate their welfare using a
terminal utility function. Second, related to this, we assume a
relatively low volatility of permanent income growth in order to
avoid large mismatches between household income and house
size. Third, our model is too stylized to capture teaser rates and
other special features of many mortgages that are offered in the
marketplace. Fourth, we work in partial equilibrium and do not
attempt to use zero-pro￿t conditions for mortgage lenders to solve
for equilibrium mortgage premiums. We believe that there is
9. Steinmetz [2002] offers a more nuanced view, stating that “Negative
amortization is not inherently bad.” However, he, like the other authors quoted
here, does not try to distinguish the real value of a debt from its nominal value.
1490 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSroom for further research to model these issues in a more satis-
factory manner.
We have calibrated our model to match basic features of the
U. S. mortgage market. Other countries have mortgage markets
that differ in important respects. For example, long-term nominal
￿xed-rate mortgages are almost unknown in the United Kingdom
and Canada. An interesting area for future research will be to
relate these international differences in prevailing mortgage con-
tracts to differences in the risk management problem that house-
holds face.
The concept of income risk that we emphasize in this paper
has interesting implications for other areas of ￿nance. Corpora-
tions, for example, must consider the risk that short-term or
￿oating-rate debt will require high interest payments in circum-
stances where internal cash ￿ow and collateral are low and ex-
ternal ￿nancing is expensive. Here as in the problem of mortgage
choice, borrowing constraints both complicate and enrich stan-
dard models of risk management.
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